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Abstract
We study the dynamics of good-by-good real exchange rates using a micro-panel of
270 goods prices across 90 international cities and 13 cities within the U.S., annually
from 1990 to 2000. The picture of relative price adjustment that emerges from our
analysis is that price adjustment is very rapid both across cities within countries and
across cities of the world. In terms of persistence of Law-of-One-Price deviations,
national borders appear not to matter. What national borders do matter for are the
magnitudes of the long run deviations from the Law-of-One-Price. Across U.S. cities
the deviations are economically small while across international cities the deviations
are economically large.
1. Introduction
We study the time series and cross-sectional behavior of 270 goods prices across 90 inter-
national and 13 U.S. cities annually from 1990 to 2000. Our goal is to use this novel data
source to shed light on the Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle, which Kenneth Rogo¤ (1996)
d e s c r i b e sa sf o l l o w s .
“How can one reconcile the enormous short-term variability of real exchange rates
with the extremely slow rate at which shocks appear to damp out? Most expla-
nations for short-term exchange rate volatility point to …nancial factors such as
changes in portfolio preferences, short-term asset price bubbles, and monetary
shocks (see, for example, Maurice Obsfteld and Rogo¤ (1998, 2000). Such shocks
can have substantial e¤ects on the real economy in the presence of sticky nomi-
nal wages and prices. Consensus estimates for the rate at which PPP deviations
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of Econometric Society for helpful comments.damp, however, suggest a half-life of three to …ve years, seemingly far too long
to be explained by nominal rigidities. It is not di¢cult to rationalize slow ad-
justment if real shocks – shocks to tastes and technology – are predominant. But
existing models based on real shocks cannot account for the short-term exchange
rate volatility.” Rogo¤ (JEL, June 1996, pp. 647-48.)
The main thesis of this paper is that the half-lives estimated in the existing empirical
literature confound two distinct properties of relative prices across locations. At any point
in time the price di¤erential of a particular good across locations must be a combination of a
transitory deviation and a permanent price di¤erence. An example of a transitory deviation
in prices across locations is one arising from a temporary disturbance that shifts supply
or demand in either location from its steady state level. Examples of sources of permanent
price di¤erences at the retail level may include transportation costs, di¤erences in sales taxes
a c r o s sl o c a t i o n so rd i ¤ e r e n c e si nt h ec o s t so fn o n - t r a d e di n p u t sa c r o s sl o c a t i o n s .A l lo ft h e s e
factors work to prevent arbitrage from driving relative prices toward the Law-of-One-Price
prediction in the long run. Because data limitations have presented formidable barriers to
investigations of the behavior of absolute prices – as opposed to price indices – these two
properties of prices have been impossible to distinguish in much of the existing literature.
In contrast, our study uses absolute price data at the level of individual retail goods and
services enabling us to estimate the long-run levels of price di¤erences and the rate at which
prices converge back to these levels once a disturbance hits a particular market.
We examine the dynamics of relative prices under two common views about their long run
means. We describe these alternative views as absolute and conditional price convergence.
Absolute convergence implies that in the long run the prices of all goods, across all locations,
obey the Law-of-One-Price. Conditional convergence implies that in the long run prices
converge to a stationary distribution, with each point in that distribution representing the
price of a good in a particular city relative to the average price of that good across all
cities. Implicit in these de…nitions is the assumption that relative prices across locations are
stationary regardless of the levels of their long-run means.
Employing these alternative assumptions about the long-run turns out to have dramatic
implications for the estimated speed of price adjustment. We …nd:
² absolute price convergence is slow (under the null that it occurs at all) both within and
across countries; half-lives average 5.4 years across international cities and 3.3 years
across U.S. cities.
² conditional price convergence is rapid, with half-lives averaging between 9-10 months
across international cities and between 9-13 months across U.S. cities.
² the unit root null is rejected for virtually all goods in the international data and is
rejected for almost all goods within the United States.
² the null of absolute price convergence is rejected for most international micro-prices,
but not rejected for about half of the goods for intranational relative prices (relative
prices across locations within the United States).
2Thus, the primary feature of relative price behavior that distinguishes locations within
countries from those we observe internationally is not the persistence of the stochastic ‡uc-
tuations of relative prices around their long run means, but the magnitude of the long run
deviations themselves. The relative price of a typical good between New York City and Los
Angeles adjusts about as quickly to a disturbance as the relative price of a typical good
between New York and Madrid; the di¤erence is that the long run di¤erential is close to zero
for most goods in the former case, but very substantial for most goods in the latter case.
Our work is mainly focused on assessing estimates of half-lives of international price
di¤erences, which Rogo¤ (1996) places at between 3 and 5 years after surveying the vast
literature on the topic. Less closely related, but also relevant, is an emerging literature
that studies the cross-sectional and time series properties of deviations from the Law-of-
One-Price at the retail level. Many of these studies utilize individual goods or subsets of
the consumption basket. Examples include Cumby (1996) who studies Big Mac hamburgers,
Froot, Kim and Rogo¤ (1995) who study wheat, butter and charcoal, Ghosh and Wolf (1994)
who study the Economist Magazine, Haskel and Wolf (1998) who study IKEA furniture, and
Lutz (2001) who studies dispersion in automobile prices across European countries.1 One
robust …nding in these papers is that Law-of-One-Price deviations often exceed what is
reasonable to attribute to transportation costs and the deviations di¤er signi…cantly across
goods even within fairly narrow commodity groupings.
One limitation of these data sources for the purposes of our work is they are limited
in either the number of goods available for examination or in the number of locations the
price survey is conducted. Having a large number of goods is important to avoid having the
results depend on price dynamics in a particular sector. For example, while Cumy (1996)
has found price convergence in Big Mac hamburgers to be quite rapid, it is di¢cult to know
if these generalizes to other goods in the consumption basket. Studies with a limited set
of locations make it di¢cult to obtain reliable inferences because researchers are unable to
exploit asymptotic properties of the estimators in the cross-sectional dimension (the time
samples are almost uniformly short).
The intranational part of our analysis is most closely related to work by Parsley and Wei
(1996) and Cecchetti, Mark and Sonora (1999). Parsley and Wei utilize the ACCRA price
survey and study the dynamics of 51 retail prices across 48 U.S. cities quarterly from 1975
to 1994. They …nd less rapid convergence rates than we do ranging from 45 months quarters
for services to 12 to 15 months for goods in terms of the half-lives. Importantly, though,
despite using di¤erent goods, a di¤erent frequency and a somewhat di¤erent methodology
(bilateral relative prices as opposed to normalizing to the U.S. average price), the half-lives
are much lower than observed internationally, consistent with our …ndings. Cecchetti, Mark
and Sonora utilize an almost century long panel of U.S. CPI data for major cities and …nd
half-lives of real exchange rates on the order of 8 to 10 years. While these half-lives are
implausible from the point of view of sluggish nominal price adjustment, they do indicate
that the half-lives of 3.3 years for the U.S. under absolute price convergence are not at
the high end of estimates existing in the literature. A third study which uses a similar
1See also, Crownover, Pippenger and Steigerwald (1996), Isard (1977), Giovannini (1988), Engel
(1993), Engel and Rogers (1996), Rogers and Jenkins (1995).
3methodology and data is Rogers (2001); he focuses on European countries and …nds quite
rapid and dramatic price convergence from 1990 to 2000.
2. Theory
2.1. A Model of Retail Price Determination
Debreu (1959) includes the location as one of the dimensions along which a commodity-space
is de…ned. What most economists have in mind when thinking of location in terms of prices
is the transportation cost of moving the good from one location to another. Thus traded
prices are – in the absence of tari¤s and other o¢cial barriers to trade – typically assumed
to satisfy the Law-of-One-Price up to a transportation cost. Because this study utilizes
retail prices, there is another aspect of location that needs to be considered. An important
di¤erence between a bottle of beer consumed at a home and a bottle of beer consumed at
a restaurant is that the “rental cost” of providing the space for consumption is counted
in the housing part of the consumer price index in the former case and in the price of a
bottle of beer away from home in the latter case. One would expect that the deviation from
the Law-of-One-Price to be bound by transportation costs and taxes in the case of home
consumption but not in the case of consumption away from home (unless rental costs happen
to be equal across locations). Moreover, the rental costs often embody something about the
location of consumption that make the beer at home and away from home di¤erent “goods”
in Debreu’s terminology. In this section we develop a simple model of price determination
that recognizes some of these features of retail markets.
Formally, we begin with the cost minimization problem of the …rm. Here a …rm is a retail
outlet that is assumed to sell a single good in a single location. Managers of retail outlets
take the prices of inputs as given. Inputs include both non-traded and traded goods and/or
services. Non-traded inputs are locally provided while traded inputs are either exported or
imported.
The cost function for the individual retail …rm is the solution to the following minimiza-




































it is the cost of producing good j in city i at time t. wit is the wage in city i and
Pk
it is the price of traded intermediate input k in location i at time t. It is natural to think
of retailers paying for non-traded inputs beyond labor services (e.g., retail space, utilities,
advertising, among others), but the wage cost will su¢ce for expositional purposes.
The distinction between non-traded and traded inputs serves two purposes. First, as
implicit in the indexing we have adopted two standard assumptions. The …rst is that factor
mobility is much higher across sectors within a location than across locations – wit is location-
speci…c, not good-speci…c. The second assumption is that retailers in all locations produce
4good j using the same production technology – ®j and µ
j
k are good-speci…c, not location-
speci…c.
Under constant returns to scale, the cost function will take the form: Yt ¢ C(Pt;1) where
Yt is the desired real output level and C(Pt;1) is the unit cost function, the object of interest.
We allow the retailer to set a – possibly time-varying – markup over marginal cost, b
j
it ¸ 1,




















Taking logarithms of (2.3) and subtracting an analogous expression for the geometric average
price of the same good across all locations (we use q
j
it to denote the relative price of good





t ) gives us an expression for the Law-of-One-Price deviation of good j in location
i relative to its geometric mean across all locations (all locations means all international























2.2. Absolute and Conditional Price Convergence
The data needed to implement the retail model is well beyond that currently available. We
have the retail prices that appear on the left-hand-side of (2.3) but we lack much of what
is described on the right-hand-side of that equation. Our approach is to cast the major
implications of the model for international and intranational retail price behavior across
locations and time based on very mild restrictions governing the evolution of the variables
that are predicted to determine the retail price.
Toward this end, we formally de…ne conditional and absolute international price conver-
gence using the notation and structure of the model. In what follows we assume the markup,
relative wage and relative prices are traded goods are all stationary stochastic processes. We
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objects are the theoretical population means of the time series observations or equivalently
the level each economic variable are assumed to reach asymptotically if current and all future
disturbances were set to zero.









meters f®j;µ 1;¢¢¢ µkg constitute a su¢cient information set to determine the retail price q
j
it
at any point in time. This follows directly from equation (2.4).
De…nition 1. Absolute price convergence. International prices are said to obey absolute
convergence if, in the absence of disturbances that alter markups and input prices over
time, the distribution of real exchange rates F(q
j
it) converges asymptotically to a degenerate
distribution at the point q
j
i =08i;j.
5Remark 2. A set of su¢cient conditions for absolute convergence in the non-stochastic
steady-state are the following: b
j
i =0 , 8i;j wi =08i, qk
it =08i;k 2 K(j). The …rst
constraint is that the markup of price over marginal cost for each good be the same across
locations. The second constraint is wage convergence across locations. The last constraint
is the convergence of traded good’s prices to the Law-of-One-Price across all locations.
Remark 3. The conditions for absolute price convergence may be relaxed by considering
the following cases. Case 1: the total cost of intermediate inputs is the same across locations:
PK(j)
k=1 µkqk
i =0 . The convergence of this sum might be plausible considering that q1
i = ¿1
i,
if intermediate input 1 is imported and q2
i = ¡¿2
i, if intermediate input 2 is exported.
Averaging over a su¢ciently large set of traded intermediate inputs would drive this number
toward zero. Case 2: If relative markups and relative wages were negatively correlated in the
cross-section, the …rst and second term in equation (2.4) will tend to average to zero. The
negative correlation would mean that low wage countries we subjected to higher markups in
product markets than higher wage countries.
De…nition 2. Conditional price convergence. International prices are said to obey condi-
tional convergence if, in the absence of disturbances that alter markups and input prices
over time, the distribution of real exchange rates F(q
j
it) converges asymptotically to the non-
degenerate distribution G(q
j
i) where the distribution G(q
j
i) is determined by the steady-state
distribution of markups, wages and trade costs across countries. The mapping between the













Much of the empirical literature on PPP and the Law-of-One-Price focuses on the trade
costs as embodied in the last term of (2.5). Using a more extensive cross-section of goods than
we study here, Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2001) document show that – consistent with
the formulation above – market structure, tradeability and the share of non-traded inputs
into production are quantitatively important features of geographic price dispersion across
European cities. Similar evidence for the U.S. via–a-vis Brazil may be found in Burstein,
Neves, and Rebelo (2001). Our notion of conditional convergence is meant to capture these
features of the price distribution.
Our empirical analysis will also contrast the behavior of relative prices across cities within
the United States. The theory outlined above is applicable to both intranational and interna-
tional contexts, but the quantitative implications are likely to be quite di¤erent. For example,
we would expect wage dispersion to be lower across regions within a country compared to
that observed internationally. The relative importance of transportation costs across and
within countries is not so obvious – overland transportation costs tend to be higher than
overseas transportation costs for many goods. Another feature that distinguishes intrana-
tional and international markets is that the nominal exchange rate is irrevocably …xed in
the former case but often ‡uctuates dramatically in the latter case. Unless nominal prices
adjust instantaneously to changes in the nominal exchange rate we should expect micro-real
exchange rates to change when the nominal exchange rate changes. Moreover, if wages ad-
just more slowly to currency ‡uctuations than do traded goods prices we would expect retail
6prices with larger wage costs to exhibit a higher degree of comovement with the nominal
exchange rate.
2.3. Implications
Since the retail price is a log-linear combination of the markup, wage rate and traded inter-
mediate good’s prices, the dynamics of the retail price is a function of the dynamic properties


















The individual e¤ect, ´
j
i, is speci…c to the location and the good and non-zero values of
these parameters is what distinguishes conditional from absolute convergence. In terms of
the parameters of our retail model the individual e¤ect and long run mean of a good-speci…c
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In words: the long-run price of good j in location i relative to the mean (across countries
or cities within a country) is equal to the relative markup plus production-shared weighted
averages of the relative wage and traded intermediate prices.
The theory has a number of testable implications and parameters of interest. Among
the testable restrictions are the stationarity of good-by-good real exchange rates and the
absence or the presence of the individual e¤ects. Stationarity is perhaps the weakest restric-
tion theoretically, requiring bounds on absolute di¤erences in markups, wages and traded
good prices. It is natural to think of traded good prices as bounded by transportation costs
and tari¤s while the entry and exit of …rms would bound the magnitude of markups across
locations. Stationarity of the relative wage may be more problematic, at least in an interna-
tional context since the costs of migration are formidable. However, for countries will similar
factor endowments and technology the wage levels might be expected to be quite similar.
Across cities within a country we would expect all of the determinants of retail prices to be
less geographically variable, with perhaps the greatest di¤erence being in wages where factor
mobility reduces the disparities substantially.
With both the theoretical and statistical model as a background it is productive to step
back and think about the implications of our model for geographic price dispersion. At any
point in time the di¤erences in prices across locations will re‡ect the combined in‡uence of
long run di¤erences in relative prices in the steady-state, the persistence of movements in
prices along the transition path, and the magnitude of the disturbances themselves. The
principle advantage of having time series and cross-sectional data on absolute prices is that
we are able to incorporate all three of these properties in our estimation technique. Thus we
will be able to provide an estimate of how much of the dispersion we see in prices at a point
in time is due to stochastic elements (such as business cycle variation and nominal exchange
rate variation) and how much is the result of di¤erent long run prices across locations.
73. Data
3.1. Measuring Law-of-One-Price Deviations
The price data is collected by the Economist Intelligence Unit in its annual international
price survey. The survey spans 301 individual retail goods and services across 122 cities
located in 78 countries. The greater number of cities than countries re‡ects the fact that in
some countries price data is gathered for more than one city. We conduct our international
analysis using one city from each country (though which city we choose varies somewhat
across goods) while for our intranational analysis, we use cities within the continental U.S.
We chose the U.S. for the simple reason that it has by far the largest number of cities surveyed
at 13, compared to the next largest number of cities surveyed which equals 5 in Australia,
China and Germany. The sample period begins in 1990 and ends in 2000.
The raw data are in domestic currency units so we begin by converting all of the prices
from domestic currency into U.S. dollars at the average exchange rate prevailing for the year
the price observation is recorded. Next, we compute the deviation of the price of each good
from its average across all locations to place all prices on a common scale. Moreover, this
normalization avoids problems inherent in choosing an arbitrary numeraire location.
For example, suppose the U.S. dollar price of good j in city i is P
j
it: Let the number of
available cities for good j be N, then the relative price (in logs) q
j
it is the price of good j in
U.S. dollars in city i relative to global mean of that good, p
j

















which is exactly the same de…nition of a real exchange rate for good j in location i at period
t, applied in the theoretical section.
Since the raw data contain a number of missing observations and we want to work with
balanced panels, we select goods and locations in the following way. First, when the exchange
rate for a particular city is not available the city is removed from all panels. Second, for each
good, cities that contain missing observations are removed.
In our estimation we pool our data across locations and time but estimate a separate
regression for each good. The number of cities we use ranges from 23 to 69 and averages
58 in the international context; it ranges from 10 to 13 and averages 13 in the intranational
context. In selecting the city to use in our international analysis we rely on the …rst city
alphabetically from each country and add cities when necessary to achieve a balanced panel
for a particular good.
Table 1 presents the cities used in our study ordered by region and then alphabetically
by country. The regions are Africa, Asia, Central America, Europe, North America, Oceania
and South America. The 13 U.S. cities used in the analysis are also reported in Table 1.
The number of goods for which a particular city is used in the estimation is noted in
parentheses. Note that in most cases the city coming …rst in the alphabet is used for almost
all of the analysis. For example, Germany is used as a location in all of the 270 (goods)
panels that we estimate, but due to missing observations we use Berlin as the German city
for 265 of those goods and Dusseldorf for the remaining 5 goods.
8Table 2 presents the breakdown of our sample of goods by our own classi…cation in
terms of major consumption categories. The span of goods and services appears broadly
representative of items found in a typical Consumer Price Index (the U.S. CPI for example)
with the number of price observations by major consumption category varying considerably
from a high of 112 (food and beverages) to a low of 3 (domestic help and salaries).
3.2. Price Dispersion
Figure 1 plots the distribution of Law-of-One-Price deviations (q
j
it) pooling all goods and
locations. The …gure presents lines for the distribution of prices within the United States
and across international cities for 3 of the 10 years available (1990, 1995 and 2000). The
densities are centered at zero, by construction and estimated using a Gaussian kernel. If the
Law-of-One-Price held for all goods and across all locations, the densities would be degenerate
at zero. Obviously there are signi…cant deviations from the Law-of-One-Price even though
many goods come close (e.g. within 10% of the prediction). Particularly striking are the
di¤erences in the international and intranational distributions. The dispersion of prices
across cities in the U.S. is signi…cant but much lower than what we observe internationally;
in 1990 the respective standard deviations are 0.281 and 0.685. The standard deviation is
quite stable over time as is evident in comparing the densities across the …ve year intervals.
The price dispersion in Figure 1 could be entirely due to di¤erences in price levels across
cities, common to all goods. For example, the cities in the richest countries might be located
in the right-hand tail of the distribution while the cities in the poorer countries might be
located in the left-hand tail of the distribution and all the price deviations are due to these
city-e¤ects. To avoid presenting two dimensions to price dispersion in a one-dimensional
…gure we average the good-by-good real exchange rates to obtain something like a PPP level





it within and across countries for
1990, 1995 and 2000. If prices were on average equal across cities, these densities would be
degenerate at zero. Obviously this is not the case; it is also clear that price levels vary much
more across countries than they do across U.S. cities.
Alternatively, the dispersion in prices could be entirely due to di¤erences in Law-of-One-
Price deviations across goods. For example, traded goods may come close to satisfying the
Law-of-One-Price prediction and therefore tend to cluster around the point 0 whereas non-
traded goods have larger deviations and are to be found in the tails of the distribution.
Figure 3 shows that Law-of-One-Price deviations are larger for non-traded goods than for
traded goods in both international and intranational distribution. Comparing Figures 2 and
3, city e¤ects appear more important than the traded/non-traded classi…cation.
One explanation for the di¤erences we observe in international and intranational price
dispersion is that nominal exchange rate ‡uctuations move real exchange rates across time
and since the U.S. is a common currency area, dispersion in price levels across cities (and
goods) is lower. Another explanation is that arbitrage costs prevent the Law-of-One-Price
from holding across locations and these costs are higher internationally than intranationally.
One of the main goals of the paper is to examine the cross-sectional time series behavior of
micro-real exchange rates to see if these alternative views can be supported.
In particular we hope to determine the relative importance of permanent deviations from
9the Law-of-One-Price and stochastic ‡uctuations around those long run levels for the shape
of the price densities both within and across countries. At one extreme, real exchange rates
may be constant over time but the Law-of-One-Price is grossly violated; thus the long run
and period-by-period densities are one in the same. At another extreme, the long run density
is degenerate, satisfying the Law-of-One-Price restriction for all goods, locations and time
periods. In this case, price distribution is entirely driven by temporary ‡uctuations around
a degenerate long run distribution.
4. The Empirical Results
4.1. Unit Root Tests
We begin our formal statistical work by conducting unit root tests for each good in our
cross-section since the economic interpretation of the sample means are not very useful if
real exchange rates are not stationary. With at most 11 time series observations for the real
exchange rate of a given city, conventional panel unit root tests are not applicable. Instead,
we pool all cities for each good and employ a panel unit root test with …xed time dimension as
developed by Richard D.F. Harris and Elias Tzavalis (1999). They considered the following
three di¤erent models:
Model with no constant: qit = ½qit¡1 + vit
Model with constant: qit = ¹i + ½qt¡1 + vit
Model with constant and trend: qit = ¹i + ¯it + ½qt¡1 + vit
where qit is the real exchange rate for a particular good in location i at date t. We suppress the
good index since this will be the basic unit of study in what follows. Corresponding unit root













N(b ½LSDV T ¡ 1 ¡ B3), respectively, where b ½POOL is the least squares
pooled estimator, b ½LSDV is the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator, b ½LSDV T is
the least squares dummy variable with trend estimator.2 As N grows, each statistic has been
shown to follow a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis of a unit root. In
the context of our analysis, the …rst test can be viewed as a test of no convergence against
the alternative of absolute convergence while the second and third tests can be viewed as a
test of no convergence against the alternative of conditional convergence.
Table 3 summarizes the results of unit root tests. In the international data we are
able to reject the null of a unit root is almost every case. Rejection rates range from 91%
when we include a constant and time trend and test at the 1% level of signi…cance to
100% when we include a constant but no time trend. The intranational evidence is not
as overwhelming in the rejection rates. However, fewer rejections for intranational data
compared to international evidence can be simply explained by the lack of power due to
small sample size. In addition, even in the case with a constant and time trend (which we
expect to have lowest power), we reject a unit root for more than one half of the goods
2C1 =2 fT(T ¡ 1)g
¡1 ;B 2 = ¡3(T +1 ) ¡1;C 2 =
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10in our sample (55%). Overall, these results are more favorable to the proposition of long
run price convergence than much of the existing literature, though not so di¤erent when
compared to results that utilize panels. The fact that we are using micro-data on goods that
are comparable across locations as well as the fact that we normalize to the cross-sectional
mean are likely to be additional important factors that distinguish our results from those in
existing work. This evidence is reassuring from a theoretical perspective since stationarity
is a weak property for international prices to satisfy, a much stronger condition is that the
Law-of-One-Price holds exactly in every time period, an issue to which we now turn.
4.2. Mean Real Exchange Rates
Table 4 reports the mean real exchange rate (average across goods) for beginning and ending
points of our sample period, 1990 and 2000. Given our normalization the means are zero
when we present statistics across all international cities or all intranational (U.S.) cities. Our
focus is on the conditional means by region, income level and the type of good.
At the regional level, we …nd a tendency for PPP deviations to fall between 1990 and
2000. Price levels, as we de…ne them, range from 21% below the world average in Africa to
9% above the world average in North America in 2000. The variation is somewhat greater
in 1990 with the Central/South America region having an average price level 33% below the
world average and Europe being 21% above the average.
One limitation of using regional aggregates such as these is that within most regions
there are wide income disparities; which in light of the pioneering work of Irving B. Kravis
and Robert E. Lipsey (1983) suggests that we may be averaging out a great deal of the
cross-country variation. The lower panel of the table breaks the regions into high and low-
to-middle income regions to address this issue.3 The variation in PPP is now obvious. For
example, while Asia as a whole is close to the world mean, the high income countries within
that region have, on average, price levels 31% above the world mean while the low-to-middle
income countries in Asia have price levels averaging 26% below the world mean. Europe,
the only other region with countries falling into both income groupings has a price level for
the high income region 41% above the world mean while the low income region has a price
level 27% below the world mean. Thus, conditioning on income levels is a key element in
international price dispersion, at least in terms of the average good.4
Focusing on the relative price levels disaggregated by income level, the changes in relative
prices over the decade of the 1990’s we do not see strong evidence of price level convergence
3The classi…cation of countries into these income groups is based on GNP per capita in Table 1. Basic
Indicators in the 1992 World Development Report (the GNP numbers are as of 1990).
4In contrast to what we …nd, the price level di¤erences across rich and poor countries found using the
International Price Comparison project data are on the order of a factor of 3 (rich country price levels are
about three times the price level in poor countries). Without delving into the details of how goods are
selected into the ICP construction, it is di¢cult to do anything more than speculate about the potential
sources of the di¤erences. The two most obvious to us are: i) the fact that the EIU data focus on urban as
opposed to rural price data and ii) the goods selected into the EIU survey are designed to give international
corporations a basis for compensating their employees in the major cities in which they work around the
globe. The basket that emerges is not representative of what the average person in the country of origin is
likely to purchase.
11or divergence. Using the means that condition on income levels, 3 groups are diverging from
the mean while 5 are converging toward the mean; in terms of the country-level data the
divergent group involves 25 countries while the convergent group involves 65 countries which
is a bit more favorable to the price level convergence hypothesis.
The last four columns of Table 4 look at the same measures but using only traded or
non-traded goods in the computations. We would expect non-traded goods to exhibit larger
deviations from the Law-of-One-Price than traded goods. We …nd strong evidence of this:
28 of the 32 measures have larger absolute values for non-traded goods than traded goods.
One would not want to interpret the quantitative importance of the deviations using these
numbers because the price di¤erence tend to average out across goods. However, the ranking
would hold up so long as this tendency was no more severe in traded goods than non-traded
goods. To get a clearer sense of dispersion we compute standard deviations of prices across
goods and locations within each of the bins of Table 4.
Table 5 reports these …ndings and includes the U.S. for comparison purposes (the U.S.
was not included in Table 4 for the simple reason that the means are zero, by construction).
Looking at the geographic dispersion in micro-real exchange rates pooling across all goods
we see that the di¤erences are not particularly great across regions or when comparing 1990
to 2000. We do see some tendency for price dispersion to be lower across high income
countries than across low income countries. For example, the standard deviation of real
exchange rates averages 0.452 for high-income European countries compared to 0.617 for
low- or middle-income European countries (in 2000).
More obvious and perhaps more interesting are the di¤erences when we condition on
tradeability. Pooling all international regions and goods the standard deviation of real ex-
change rates is 0.626 for traded goods and 0.855 for non-traded goods (in 1990). Thus we
see larger deviations from the Law-of-One-Price for non-traded goods as we would expect.
Two numbers that stand out in Table 5 relate to the high income European group where
dispersion in traded goods drops from 0.367 in 1990 to 0.107 in 2000. Presumably this has
to do with policies promoting European Union economic integration.
Traded good price dispersion is lower than non-traded good price dispersion in both in the
international and intranational data as one would expect, but the dispersion of prices in the
U.S. is strictly less than that observed internationally even controlling for the type of good
under consideration. The dispersion prices across locations (within the U.S.) for non-traded
goods is 0.344 in 1990 signi…cantly lower even than the dispersion of traded goods prices
internationally which has a dispersion of 0.626.
The ratio of variance is between 5 and 6 when moving from intranational price dispersion
to international price dispersion. In other words, if we take the variance of traded goods
prices in the year 2000 for both the U.S. and average internationally, the geographic variance
of prices within the U.S. was about 5.5% while that observed internationally was 27.8%. To
place these numbers in perspective, if each city specialized in the production of a particular
good and trade took place across all locations, these variances would be consistent with
transportation costs of 5.5% and 27.8%, respectively. For non-traded goods the correspond-
ing numbers would be 10% and 60%, which seems to indicate that we would have to go
beyond transport costs and recognize the role of non-traded inputs and other factors that
12contribute to price dispersion to account for the international data.
Recall that our retail pricing model predicts that greater wage dispersion across locations
would give rise to greater retail price dispersion across locations, but with the e¤ect magni…ed
for retail goods which used larger shares of non-traded inputs (such as labor). The broad
features of the dispersion measures in Table 5 are consistent with this prediction.
4.3. Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
Based on the unit root tests, we found the evidence against nonstationarity of Law-of-One-
Price deviations. This implies the possibility of either absolute or conditional convergence
of the price deviations. To compare the two classes of price convergence, we consider the
estimation of AR(1) models with and without good-speci…c city e¤ects. All the models are
estimated for each good separately. If the Law-of-One-Price holds in the long-run for each
good then absolute convergence is said to prevail and we consider the following speci…cation:
qit = ¹ + ½qi;t¡1 + vit. (4.1)
To estimate this model, we employ the least squares pooled estimator (b ½POOL) where it is
understood that pooling is across locations which are indexed by i and not goods (Goods
are indexed by j therefore we again drop the superscript for goods).
Alternatively, long run LOP may fail to hold for each good, then conditional convergence
is said to occur and the following AR(1) model with unobserved individual-speci…c e¤ects is
appropriate:
qit = ½qi;t¡1 + ´i + vit (4.2)
for i =1 ;:::;N and t =2 ;:::;T,a n dj½j < 1. We assume that individual e¤ect ´i and the
time-varying error vit are independently distributed across i and
E(´i)=0 ;E (vit)=0 ; and E(vit´i)=0for i =1 ;:::;N and t =2 ;:::;T:
We allow heterosckedasticity of vit, but exclude the possibility of serial correlation
E(vitvis)=0 for i =1 ;:::;N and for all t 6= s:
For the initial conditions qi1,w ea s s u m e
E(qi1vit)=0 for i =1 ;:::;N and t =2 ;:::;T:
One way of estimating this model is to use the LSDV estimator b ½LSDV which is known to be
consistent with large T. However, with the short time span of our data, the presence of bias
in this estimator should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results. To avoid
this inconsistency issue, it is common practice to use the GMM estimator (b ½GMM) based on
the …rst di¤erence transformation,
qit ¡ qi;t¡1 = ½(qi;t¡1 ¡ qi;t¡2)+( vit ¡ vi;t¡1) for t =3 ;:::;T;
13with instruments selected from the orthogonality condition,
E [qis (vit ¡ vi;t¡1)] = 0 for s =1 ;:::;t ¡ 2 and t =3 ;:::;T:
Despite the theoretical superiority, simulation results sometimes show inaccuracy of the
…rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator (see Jan F. Kiviet, 1995 for example). On balance, we
report both LSDV and GMM estimates of the autoregressive parameter ½, but we leave the
bias issue in LSDV estimator to the discussion section.
The estimated persistence parameters for both (4.1) and (4.2) based on least squares
method are reported in Table 6. Beginning with the international estimates we see that the
average autoregressive coe¢cient estimate under the absolute convergence hypothesis (or
b ½POOL) is equal to 0.88, indicating substantial persistence in real exchange rates; similar to
what is found in the literature using aggregate price indices. The standard errors are small
and the con…dence intervals have upper-bounds typically below unity, consistent with our
prior rejection of unit roots. The persistence parameters range from a low of 0.73 to a high
of 0.99, across individual goods.
Turning to the estimates that allow for city-e¤ects (or b ½LSDV), the results are quite di¤er-
ent. Now the average autoregressive coe¢cient is 0.43 with individual estimates ranging from
0.15 to 0.86. The standard errors are on average twice that of the pooled estimates, but the
estimates under absolute and conditional convergence are statistically signi…cantly di¤erent
from one another. This point can be seen more in detail in Figure 4A which shows empirical
distribution of b ½POOL and b ½LSDV with their two standard error bands. Obviously, the two
estimates are economically distinct with the half-lives under absolute convergence averaging
5.4 years compared to a mere 10 months under the conditional convergence speci…cation.
Contrary to our expectations, the persistence of Law-of-One-Price deviations across U.S.
cities are comparable to what we …nd internationally. The autoregressive coe¢cients average
0.81 based on absolute price convergence estimates (b ½POOL) and 0.53 based on conditional
price convergence estimates (b ½LSDV ). Empirical distribution of both estimates with error
bands for intranational case are shown in Figure 4B. The range of parameter estimates is
0.39 to 1.0 for b ½POOL a n d0 . 0 5t o0 . 9 1f o rb ½LSDV; standard errors for both speci…cations
are larger than what we …nd in the international case, likely due to the smaller number
of cities available in the U.S. panels compared to the international panels. The half lives
for deviations from the Law-of-One-Price across U.S. cities are 3.3 years under absolute
convergence compared to 13 months under conditional convergence.
To investigate the plausibility of two alternative speci…cations, we conduct the F test for
the joint signi…cance of the dummy variables used for b ½LSDV.S u c hat e s tc a nb ev i e w e da sa
test for the null of absolute convergence against the alternative of conditional convergence.
The results for the F test are also reported in Table 6. The no individual e¤ect hypothesis
is signi…cantly rejected for most international micro-prices di¤erences, but not rejected for
about half of the goods for intranational case.. This result suggests that the data is consistent
with the conditional convergence hypothesis along with the theory of retail price at least for
international case.
The econometric explanation for the di¤erences in the persistence estimates under ab-
solute and conditional convergence is straight-forward. Figure 5 sketches representative re-
gression lines, location-by-location for a particular good with and without city-e¤ects. The
14thin ‡at lines are what one estimates under conditional convergence, where a constant term
in each regression relationship allows each good to converge to a unique, city-speci…c, mean.
The bold line is what is estimated under the assumption of absolute convergence, which …ts
a single regression line to the entire panel of observations for a particular good. Station-
arity of the individual real exchange rates about their location-speci…c means ensures that
most sample points lie close to the 45± line so the slope parameter (persistence) is biased
upward under absolute convergence. This argument implies that in forcing goods to satisfy
the Law-of-One-Price in the long run when the sample means are far from that prediction
and persistence at the micro-level is low, a severe upward bias in persistence of the deviations
results.
Table 7 reports analogous results for absolute and conditional convergence based on the
GMM estimator. In addition to the …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimates (b ½GMM) under the
conditional convergence speci…cation, we also report the GMM estimates (b ½
¤
GMM) under the
absolute convergence which is the GMM counterpart of b ½POOL.F o rb o t hb ½¤
GMM and b ½GMM,
the numbers are generally very close to what we get using the least squares method. One
key di¤erence, though, is the lower average persistence measure in the intranational (U.S.)
estimates under the conditional convergence speci…cation. The consequence of this lower
estimate is that the average persistence in the international and intranational data under
conditional convergence is now statistically indistinguishable. Recall, that using the LSDV
estimator (b ½LSDV) it appeared that under conditional convergence, the U.S. deviations were
actually more persistent than the international deviations. Thus in checking the robustness
of our results using an alternative estimator we discount the potentially counter intuitive
result that Law-of-One-Price deviations are less persistent internationally than intranation-
ally. However, the issue of …nite sample bias remains and we leave it to the next section to
determine if we might be more de…nitive on the ranking of international and intranational
price persistence. Similar to the least square case, we can conduct the test of no individ-
ual e¤ects with GMM estimator as a test for the absolute price convergence against the
conditional price convergence. The results for this test are also reported in Table 7. Just
like the least squares case, the absolute convergence hypothesis is signi…cantly rejected with
international data. However, for all the case, we could not reject the same null hypothesis
with intranational data with any conventional signi…cance level.
The picture of relative price adjustment that emerges from our analysis of micro-data is
that price adjustment is very rapid both across cities within countries and across cities of the
world. In terms of persistence of Law-of-One-Price deviations, national borders appear not to
matter. What national borders do matter for are the magnitudes of the long run deviations
from the Law-of-One-Price. Across U.S. cities the deviations are economically small while
across international cities the deviations are economically large. As a consequence, much of
the dispersion we observe in Figures 1 and 2 is not the result of stochastic ‡uctuations in
relative prices over time but rather re‡ects permanent (at least as permanent as our sample
length of 10 years will allow us to estimate) deviations from the Law-of-One-Price.
155. Discussion
5.1. Aggregation






that all prices were already in U.S. dollar, we construct aggregate real exchange rate in the
standard way: qit ´ Pit ¡ Pt (standard except that we use the average price level in the
world as the numeraire price.
Note that if the persistence parameters are the same across goods, then the aggregate real
exchange rate will have the same persistence as the micro-real exchange rates. To determine
if this is the case, we estimate the following regressions:
qit = ½qi;t¡1 + ´i + vit conditional convergence
qit = ½qi;t¡1 + vit absolute convergence.
where the bars over the variables indicate averages across goods, location-by-location. Esti-
mating this speci…cation for the aggregated real exchange rate we get parameter estimates
of 0.89 and 0.34 for the international data under absolute and conditional convergence,
respectively. Recall the averages of the analogous estimates at the micro-level were 0.88 and
0.43, respectively. Thus it appears that the our persistence results are preserved under this
form of aggregation and by implication that the high persistence obtained elsewhere in the
literature using CPI data appears not to be a consequence of simple aggregation bias.5
5.2. Weighting Method
Another possible explanation for the persistence of deviations found in aggregate studies
is that consumption weights di¤er across countries i and k. Consider two goods and two





















where lower case variables refer to logarithms. Now suppose prices actually obey the law of
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The implication is that unless the price of good 1 relative to good 2 is constant over time,
national price indices will diverge from the PPP prediction even when the Law-of-One-
Price holds exactly. Given that relative price levels are quite di¤erent across countries the
expenditure shares might be expected to be di¤erent. Thus movements in the price of one
good relative to another that is common to all countries (e.g. computer prices relative to
oil prices) would move price indices by di¤erent amounts across countries due to di¤erent
consumption weighting schemes. Given that these relative price movements are likely to be
persistent, considerable autocorrelation might result.
5The issue of temporal aggregation has been discussed in Alan M. Taylor (2001).
16Turning the argument on its head, we know that the goods included in the CPI are
di¤erent in each country. Even if the consumption weights on various categories such as
food, consumption and shelter were identical across countries the ‘goods’ in these bundles
are often very di¤erent and the above argument goes through.
5.3. Bias
In the main section, we presented the results from LSDV and GMM estimation. For the
LSDV estimator with …xed T, Nickell (1981) derived a formula for the asymptotic bias when
N tends to in…nity. The bias formula is given by,
plim
N!1














Therefore, the inconsistency with …xed T results from the asymptotic bias of order O(T¡1)
which is always negative given 0 <½<1. In contrast, the GMM estimator does not su¤er
from this type of asymptotic bias (and is therefore consistent) while the …nite sample bias
due to a …xed N may still be present. The bias formula has an approximation error of
O(N¡1T¡3=2) and when the bias is corrected, the LSDV estimator is consistent not just
for large T but also for …nite T with large N. Kiviet (1995) suggests correcting the LSDV
estimators with a consistent bias estimation method. Following Kiviet, we report the bias
corrected LSDV estimator where the bias of original LSDV estimator b ½LSDV is evaluated
using a consistent estimator of persistence, namely the GMM estimator b ½GMM.U n l i k e
Kiviet’s case, it should be noted that this bias formula does not require the estimation of
error variance since we do not have exogenous variables in the autoregressive model.
Table 8 reports the results of bias adjustment along with the original LSDV and GMM
estimates. The bias corrected persistence parameter averages 0.58 in the international data,
compared to 0.68 for the intranational data. While the bias correction for the mean of the
estimated parameters is about 0.10 in both cases, the fact that the LSDV estimates start out
at a higher level implies that the bias-corrected estimated remain higher in the intranational
data. In terms of estimated half-lives, the average for the international cities is 15 months
compared to about 21 months across U.S. cities. While there may be a statistically signi…cant
di¤erence here, the main implication of the paper – that conditional convergence is much
faster than absolute convergence in both the international and intranational context – is
…rmly upheld.
Figures 6A and 6B present detailed good-by-good persistence measures for the inter-
national and intranational panels. In both …gures, the x-axis measures the persistence es-
timated under absolute convergence while the y-axis measures the persistence parameters
under conditional convergence. We see that in each case the good-by-good estimates are
highly positively correlated – a regression line through the two scatters yields an almost
identical slope of 1.1. Thus the di¤erences between international and intranational persis-
tence is di¢cult to detect at the microeconomic level. The only substantive di¤erence across
17the two …gures is the center of the scatter-plots which represent the mean bias-adjusted
LSDV persistence estimates which were already discussed in relation to Table 8.
5.4. Conclusions and Implications for Future Work
Our results appear to go part way toward resolving the Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle in the
following sense. Viewed from the perspective of our microeconomic evidence, the persistence
of real exchange rates is an artifact of mis-speci…cation of the long run distribution of relative
prices. When conditional convergence is assumed, persistence is low, easily within the range
typically considered plausible for models with nominal rigidities.
The notion expressed by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (in describing the PPP puzzle) that real
factors induce persistence but not large changes in relative prices was another piece of the
puzzle. Taken literally, our results indicate the existence of large and permanent deviations
from the Law-of-One-Price in the international data. If we interpret these permanent di¤er-
ences as real factors – as many prominent theories, including the Balassa-Samuelson (1964)
hypothesis would suggest – they are very important quantitatively. Moreover, the changes
in relative prices over the business cycle due to real shocks would fall into the same category
as the nominal shocks based on our empirical model. Ironically, real shocks may deliver too
much persistence in the deviations!
In studying micro-economic deviations from the Law-of-One-Price we do raise an im-
portant empirical puzzle; namely the inconsistency between the persistence of good-speci…c
deviations and deviations as measured by the CPI. We have already noted that our evidence
holds up under a simple aggregation scheme (an equally weighted average of individual real
exchange rates) so the di¤erence between our …nding and that in the aggregate studies does
not appear to be due to aggregation.
We plan to explore a number of issues in future work. First, we plan to investigate the
robustness of our aggregation results to alternative weighting methodologies – expenditure
weights versus equal weighting, for example. Second, we will consider the issue of using
a numeraire in the analysis as opposed to our numeraire independent measure of the real
exchange rate. David Papell (1997) has emphasized that much of the existing literature has
used the U.S. dollar as the numeraire and the persistence of exchange rates may be a re‡ection
of movements in the bilateral dollar exchange rates and not necessarily movements in relative
prices across other bilateral pairings. Last, we intend to conduct a more comprehensive
review of the comparability of the baskets that are priced in the CPI. A major di¤erence
between the types of data found in the EIU panel (as well as that studied by Crucini, Telmer
and Zachariadis (2001)) is that the CPI is intended to maximize comparability of goods over
time while the cross-sectional panels attempt to maximize comparability across locations.
That these two methodologies lead to di¤erent empirical implications regarding real exchange
rate behavior at the disaggregate and aggregate levels may turn out to be a function of the
survey design. We believe that these avenues will help us to reconcile the microeconomic




The data are collected in the Worldwide Cost of Living Survey compiled by the Economist
Intelligence Unit. The intent of the survey is to provide human resource managers with data
on which to base compensation decisions across countries. The survey covers 122 cities and
301 goods or services. Many goods prices are collected in di¤erent types of retail outlets.
In our analysis we use only large-scale retail outlets to avoid have goods appear more than
once in our analysis.
A.2. GMM Estimation
Under the assumptions in the main text, the …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator of AR coe¢-
cient ½ based on m =( T ¡ 1)(T ¡ 2)=2 total moment conditions can be written as
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19where b ui are residual vectors from the …rst step estimator.
For the GMM estimation without individual (city) e¤ects, T ¡ 1 additional moment
conditions are available since total of m¤ = T(T ¡ 1)=2 moment conditions are implied by
E [qisvit]=0 for s =1 ;:::;t ¡ 1 and t =2 ;:::;T:
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N is an optimal weighting matrix. Test statistic for the null hypothesis of no
individual e¤ects can be constructed based on the test of the validity of T ¡ 1 additional
restrictions (Holtz-Eakin, 1988). Under the null hypothesis,
L = J
¤ ¡ J
where J¤ is the criterion function for b ½
¤
GMM and J is the criterion function for b ½GMM with
weighting matrix obtained from the submatrix of S¤
N, follows chi-squared distribution with
T ¡ 1 degree of freedom.
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22TABLE 1 – LOCATIONS
City, Country (No. of goods) City, Country (No. of goods) City, Country (No. of goods)
(1) International Data Vienna, Austria (263) Adelaide, Australia (251)
Bahrain, Bahrain (230) Brussels, Belgium (263) Brisbane, Australia (12)
Dhaka, Bangladesh (133) Prague, Czech (188) Melbourne, Australia (2)
Beijing, China (144) Copenhagen, Denmark (264) Perth, Australia (2)
Hong Kong, Hong Kong (242) Helsinki, Finland (255) Sydney, Australia (2)
New Delhi, India (57) Lyon, France (261) Auckland, New Zealand (257)
Mumbai, India (146) Paris, France (7) Wellington, New Zealand (5)
Jakarta, Indonesia (183) Berlin, Germany (265)
Tehran, Iran (181) Dusseldorf, Germany (5) San Jose, Costa Rica (230)
Tel Aviv, Israel (255) Athens, Greece (247) Guatemala City, Guatemala (221)
Osaka Kobe, Japan (244) Budapest, Hungary (255) Mexico City, Mexico (238)
Tokyo, Japan (7) Dublin, Ireland (248) Panama City, Panama (242)
Amman, Jordan (137) Milan, Italy (263)
Seoul, Korea (167) Rome, Italy (5) Calgary, Canada (250)
Kuala Lumpur,Malaysia (244) Luxembourg, Luxembourg (260) Montreal, Canada (15)
Karachi, Pakistan (192) Amsterdam, Netherlands (260) Toronto, Canada (3)
Manila,Philippines (211) Oslo, Norway (233) Atlanta, USA (249)
Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia (203) Warsaw, Poland (232) Boston, USA (11)
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (17) Lisbon, Portugal (267) Chicago, USA (5)
Singapore, Singapore (256) Bucharest, Romania (1) Cleveland, USA (3)
Colombo, Sri Lanka (212) Moscow, Russia (116) New York, USA (1)
Taipei, Taiwan (215) Barcelona, Spain (268)
Bangkok, Thailand (257) Stockholm, Sweden (252)
Abu Dhabi, UAE (238) Geneva, Switzerland (262) (2) Intranational Data
Dubai, UAE (11) Zurich, Switzerland (6) Atlanta, USA (248)
Istanbul, Turkey (253) Boston, USA (257)
Abidjan, Cote dIvoire (242) London, UK (261) Chicago, USA (251)
Cairo, Egypt (197) Belgrade, Yugoslavia (105) Cleveland, USA (249)
Nairobi, Kenya (233) Detroit, USA (260)
Tripoli, Libya (51) Buenos Aires, Argentina (253) Houston, USA (250)
Casa Blanca, Morocco (199) Sao Paulo, Brazil (255) Los Angeles, USA (248)
Lagos, Nigeria (204) Santiago, Chile (257) Miami, USA (253)
Dakar, Senegal (197) Bogota, Columbia (235) New York, USA (234)
Johannesburg, South Africa (253) Quito, Ecuador (177) Pittsburgh, USA (235)
Tunis, Tunisia (186) Asuncion, Paraguay (250) San Francisco, USA (230)
Harare, Zimbabwe (200) Lima, Peru (1) Seattle, USA (252)
Monte Video, Uruguay (257) Washington DC, USA (255)
Caracas, Venezuela (238)
Note: Entries are the city in which the price data are collected, the country to which the city belongs
and the number of goods in the analysis for which that city is used
23TABLE 2 – GOODS BY CONSUMPTION CATEGORY
EIU Category No. of goods BLS Category No. of goods
Food and beverages 112
Alcohol 20
Tobacco 5
Category total 137 Food and beverages 73
Utilities 6 Fuel and Utilities 12
Household goods 26
Shelter 19
Category total 45 Household services and furnishings 66
Clothing 32 Apparel and upkeep 47
Transportation 18 Transportation 34
Medical care 18






Category total 54 Other commodities and services 21
Grand total 304 Grand total 298
24TABLE 3 – SUMMARY RESULTS OF UNIT ROOT TESTS
Signi…cance Constant
levels No constant Constant and trend
Panel A: International estimates
0.01 268 (99%) 270 (100%) 247 (91%)
0.05 268 (99%) 270 (100%) 259 (96%)
0.10 268 (99%) 270 (100%) 259 (96%)
Panel B: Intranational estimates
0.01 199 (81%) 181 (74%) 76 (31%)
0.05 217 (88%) 206 (84%) 113 (46%)
0.10 229 (93%) 221 (90%) 136 (55%)
Notes: Number of goods is 270 in Panel A and 245 in Panel B. Number in the table are
the number of goods we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. The numbers in parentheses
are the numbers of rejection expressed as a percentage of the total number of goods, 270 or
245. Models with no constant, constant and constant/trend for individual (city) e¤ects are
estimated by least squares pooled estimator, least squares dummy variable estimator, and
least squares dummy variable with trend estimator, respectively. See Harris and Tzavalis
(1999).
25TABLE 4 – MEAN REAL EXCHANGE RATES
Non-traded
All goods Traded goods goods
Region (No. of cities) 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
All regions (90) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Africa (10) -0.02 -0.21 0.01 -0.15 -0.13 -0.42
Asia (24) -0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.07 -0.11 -0.05
Central/South America (13) -0.33 -0.02 -0.32 -0.05 -0.35 0.05
Europe (28) 0.21 0.06 0.18 0.03 0.30 0.17
North America (8) -0.17 0.09 -0.16 0.07 -0.20 0.13
Oceania (7) 0.07 -0.13 0.05 -0.12 0.12 -0.14
High income regions (42) 0.33 0.20 0.30 0.16 0.45 0.32
Africa (0) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Asia (8) 0.31 0.48 0.28 0.45 0.42 0.60
Central/South America (0) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Europe (19) 0.41 0.15 0.37 0.11 0.57 0.30
North America (8) -0.17 0.09 -0.16 0.07 -0.20 0.13
Oceania (7) 0.07 -0.13 0.05 -0.12 0.12 -0.14
Low/middle income regions (48) -0.23 -0.14 -0.21 -0.12 -0.30 -0.21
Africa (10) -0.02 -0.21 0.01 -0.15 -0.13 -0.42
Asia (16) -0.26 -0.20 -0.22 -0.14 -0.37 -0.38
Central/South America (13) -0.33 -0.02 -0.32 -0.05 -0.35 0.05
Europe (9) -0.27 -0.16 -0.26 -0.16 -0.31 -0.13
North America (0) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Oceania (0) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: These real exchange rates use the world average price.
26TABLE 5 – DISPERSION IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES
Non-traded
All goods Traded goods goods
Region (No. of cities) 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
All regions (90) 0.685 0.594 0.626 0.527 0.855 0.777
Africa (10) 0.659 0.596 0.634 0.533 0.724 0.727
Asia (24) 0.724 0.706 0.675 0.656 0.861 0.844
Central/South America (13) 0.637 0.540 0.540 0.479 0.893 0.704
Europe (28) 0.648 0.526 0.595 0.448 0.800 0.726
North America (8) 0.479 0.500 0.377 0.389 0.737 0.776
Oceania (7) 0.449 0.408 0.360 0.343 0.675 0.582
High income regions (42) 0.525 0.499 0.467 0.450 0.680 0.630
Africa (0)
Asia (8) 0.568 0.521 0.520 0.490 0.699 0.602
Central/South America (0) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Europe (19) 0.500 0.452 0.367 0.107 0.625 0.572
North America (8) 0.479 0.500 0.377 0.389 0.737 0.776
Oceania (7) 0.449 0.408 0.360 0.343 0.675 0.582
Low/middle income regions (48) 0.689 0.614 0.640 0.547 0.826 0.791
Africa (10) 0.659 0.596 0.634 0.533 0.724 0.727
Asia (16) 0.721 0.679 0.685 0.642 0.812 0.754
Central/South America (13) 0.637 0.540 0.540 0.479 0.893 0.704
Europe (9) 0.703 0.617 0.664 0.493 0.821 0.923
North America (0) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Oceania (0) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
U.S. cities (13) 0.281 0.254 0.262 0.234 0.344 0.318
27TABLE 6 – SUMMARY RESULTS OF POOLED/LSDV ESTIMATES
No. Cities b ½POOL se b ½LSDV se Fp -value
Panel A: International estimates
median 60.000 0.889 0.014 0.430 0.033 3.082 0.000
mean 57.893 0.880 0.017 0.433 0.040 3.168 0.001
std 8.881 0.055 0.013 0.103 0.031 0.763 0.020
min 23.000 0.735 0.002 0.153 0.005 1.095 0.000
max 69.000 0.987 0.135 0.864 0.290 5.286 0.330
Panel B: Intranational estimates
median 13.000 0.833 0.034 0.542 0.051 2.003 0.032
mean 12.689 0.814 0.042 0.531 0.066 2.218 0.106
std 0.732 0.114 0.031 0.170 0.053 1.335 0.161
min 10.000 0.392 0.004 0.051 0.002 0.613 0.000
max 13.000 1.016 0.180 0.914 0.401 17.469 0.816
Notes: Number of goods is 270 in Panel A and 245 in Panel B. Pooled estimates (b ½POOL)
and LSDV estimates (b ½LSDV) are reported with heterosckedasticity-consistent standard er-
rors (se). F and p-value are the F test statistics for no individual (city) e¤ects and their
p-values, respectively.
28TABLE 7 – SUMMARY RESULTS OF GMM ESTIMATES
No. Cities b ½
¤
GMM se b ½GMM se Lp -value
Panel A: International estimates
median 60.000 0.819 0.003 0.406 0.011 51.350 0.000
mean 57.893 0.811 0.004 0.404 0.012 49.613 0.005
std 8.881 0.077 0.002 0.137 0.005 8.181 0.064
min 23.000 0.567 0.000 -0.123 0.000 3.269 0.000
max 69.000 0.979 0.017 0.734 0.042 61.671 0.974
Panel B: Intranational estimates
median 13.000 0.790 0.050 0.445 0.114 11.451 0.323
mean 12.661 0.754 0.053 0.405 0.124 11.096 0.359
std 0.732 0.158 0.029 0.231 0.066 1.503 0.123
min 10.000 0.179 0.003 -0.251 0.011 3.185 0.229
max 13.000 1.019 0.174 0.910 0.383 12.911 0.977
Notes: Number of goods is 270 in Panel A and 245 in Panel B. Two-step GMM estimates
without individual (city) e¤ect (b ½¤
GMM) and two-step GMM estimates based on …rst di¤erence
(b ½GMM) are reported with heterosckedasticity-consistent standard errors (se). L and p-
value are the GMM-based test statistics for no individual (city) e¤ects and their p-values,
respectively.
29T A B L E8–S U M M A R YR E S U L T SO FB I A SC O R R E C T I O N S
bias corrected
b ½POOL b ½LSDV b ½GMM
d bias b ½LSDV
Panel A: International estimates
median 0.889 0.430 0.406 -0.148 0.573
mean 0.880 0.433 0.404 -0.148 0.581
std 0.055 0.103 0.137 0.014 0.114
min 0.735 0.153 -0.123 -0.182 0.265
max 0.987 0.864 0.734 -0.092 1.012
Panel B: Intranational estimates
median 0.833 0.540 0.445 -0.150 0.683
mean 0.814 0.532 0.405 -0.146 0.678
std 0.114 0.170 0.231 0.024 0.183
min 0.392 0.051 -0.251 -0.199 0.174
max 1.016 0.914 0.910 -0.078 1.109
Notes: Number of goods is 270 in Panel A and 245 in Panel B. Bias of LSDV estimator
is estimated by GMM estimator.
30Figure 4A. International estimates of ρ  by good

































































 = 0.88Figure 4B. Intranational estimates of ρ  by good

























Figure 5. Upward bias in real exchange rate persistence
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